A Worker's Travel Time is Compensable when it is Integral and Indispensable to Their Principal Activity

Kathryn Bennett, Law Clerk

On Monday October 6, 2025, the Supreme Court declined to review a Third Circuit ruling on whether home health aides’ (“HHA”) travel time between patient visits during one continuous workday must be compensated under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”).  The Supreme Court’s decision to decline review effectively allows the circuit courts to follow the Third Circuit’s reasoning for determining whether travel time is integral and indispensable to the employee’s principal working activity. 

Supreme Court Denies Petition for Certiorari in Sec'y United States Dep't of Lab. v. Nursing Home Care Mgmt. Inc., 128 F.4th 146 (3d Cir. 2025)

            On October 6, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the lower courts’ decision finding that employers must compensate employees for travel time that is “integral and indispensable” to employees’ principal activities under the FLSA. Sec'y United States Dep't of Lab. v. Nursing Home Care Mgmt. Inc., 128 F.4th 146 (3d Cir. 2025), cert. denied sub nom. Nursing Home Care Mgmt., et. al., v. Chavez-DeRemer, Sec. of Labor, 2025 WL 2823746 (Oct. 6, 2025) (“Home Care Mgmt.”).

            The main point of law at issue in Home Care Mgmt. was whether travel by HHAs between the start of their first appointment and the end of their last appointment was compensable under the FLSA, or whether it was excluded from compensable time under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,[1] an amendment to the FLSA.  Defendant Nursing Home Care (“Home Care”) argued that the time HHAs spent traveling between different patients’ homes in one day was not compensable, because that travel was not “integral and indispensable” to the HHA’s work activities.  In rejecting Home Care’s argument, the Third Circuit relied upon IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that travel time is not integral and indispensable when it is at least “two steps removed from the productive activity.”[2]  IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).  Unlike the IBP employees, the Third Circuit explained that the time the HHAs spent traveling between home care visits was integral and indispensable to their principal activity of working in the patient’s home – and thus, was compensable under the FLSA.

The Tenth Circuit (Which Includes Colorado) Provides Support for the Home Care Mgmt. Decision

            In finding the HHAs travel time was compensable, the lower courts relied on the Tenth Circuit case United Transp. Union Loc. 1745 v. City of Albuquerque,[3]  where the Court held that time spent traveling on city shuttles to relief points at the beginning and end of the split shift period was compensable time “since [the] riding of shuttles was integral and indispensable to city's system of dispatching and relieving drivers at different times and remote locations throughout the city.”  City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 1999).  Similarly, because Home Care’s business model requires HHAs to travel to different locations throughout a continuous workday to provide their services, traveling to and from home care visits was integral and indispensable to the primary activity of working at a patient’s home.  Thus, the Third Circuit ruling required Home Care to pay back approximately $7 million in damages to its HHAs.

The lower courts’ reliance on City of Albuquerque indicates a growing trend to ensure employees are compensated for travel time under the continuous workday theory when the travel time is integral to the employee’s work.  Employers should consider whether their business puts similar demands on employees as those in Home Care Mgmt. to travel to different locations in one continuous workday, and if so, whether such commutes could be considered integral to the employees’ work.  Campbell Litigation will continue providing updates on these and other developments in the law and remains available to answer your questions.

[1] See 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262.

[2] Predonning waiting time – the time spent waiting to don necessary protective gear – was “two steps removed” from the productive activity, working on the production floor of IBP’s meat processing facility.  IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 40 (2005).  Rather, “don[ning] the first piece of gear [] marks the beginning of the continuous workday,” since donning is integral and indispensable to the principal activity on the assembly line.  Id.

[3] United Transp. Union Loc. 1745 v. City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 1999).